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Abstract—Insiders are the trusted entities in the organization,
but poses threat to the with access to sensitive information
network and resources. The insider threat detection is a well
studied problem in security analytics. Identifying the features
from data sources and using them with the right data analytics
algorithms makes various kinds of threat analysis possible.
The insider threat analysis is mainly done using the frequency
based attributes extracted from the raw data available from
data sources. In this paper, we propose an image-based feature
representation of the daily resource usage pattern of users in
the organization. The features extracted from the audit files of
the organization are represented as gray scale images. Hence,
these images are used to represent the resource access patterns
and thereby the behavior of users. Classification models are
applied to the representative images to detect anomalous behavior
of insiders. The images are classified to malicious and non-
malicious. The effectiveness of the proposed representation is
evaluated using the CMU CERT data V4.2, and state-of-art
image classification models like Mobilenet, VGG and ResNet. The
experimental results showed improved accuracy. The comparison
with existing works show a performance improvement in terms
of high recall and precision values.
Index Terms—deep learning, insider threat, transfer learning,
machine learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Drastic increase in the technology left people at high risk
of cyber attacks in all domains. E-commerce is increasingly
becoming popular on networked devices. The consequences of
cybercrimes are frightening. Nowadays, cyber criminals use
trending technology to carry out attacks which are difficult to
detect. The main goal of cybersecurity is to protect all the
resources connected to network ranging from any hardware,
applications like mobile phones and laptops, software and any
other data in transit.
Researchers use data analysis techniques to detect and
mitigate security challenges. The use of statistical learning,
machine learning, artificial intelligence, natural language pro-
cessing techniques, etc. has been broadened to solve cy-
bersecurity usecases like detecting malwares and intrusions,
phishing, denial of service(DoS) attacks etc. Data analytics
is effectively applied in cybersecurity to identify patterns and
correlations among events, and to do the behavior analysis to
bring out anomalies thereby improving the security system of
any organization.
Security analytics is an approach of data processing which
combines acquisition of data, aggregation and analysis tech-
niques for security monitoring and threat detection. Security
analytics solutions can be applied on large and diverse data
sets using machine learning, deep learning and artificial intel-
ligence framework.
Deep Learning(DL), a subset of machine learning, refers
to learning the data using a number of layers in a neural
network. A shallow network has one hidden layer whereas
a deep network has multiple hidden layers that allows it to
learn features of the data in a hierarchy. This is because
simple features like two pixels are recombined from a layer
to the next to make more complex features like a line. In
deep learning, input data (features) is passed through more
mathematical operations. This is why the training phase in the
deep learning algorithms are computationally intensive Hence
the DL modeling is achieved widely using GPUs.
Deep learning models are largely employed for security
related problems like intrusion detection, malware analysis.
Deep Convolutional Neural Networks(DCNNs or DeepCon-
vNets) proved to be highly efficient in handling visual data,
such as images and videos [1]. DCNNs take the unprocessed
data as input and transforms by processing through a series of
basic computational units to get the representations that have
useful values for classification in the higher layers.
Insider threat is one of the most popular attacks that happen
from the trusted employees or a system or person associated
with that organization. These employees may have access
to sensitive information and resources. There can be many
reasons for the insider attacks like unintentional human error,
conflict with co-workers or managers, bribed by competing
organizations. Insider threats are mainly targeted at the viola-
tion and sabotage of computer systems and the data exfiltration
activities.
As per the recent statistics from the Verizon 2019 Data
Breach Investigations report, insiders caused 34% of all se-
curity breaches in 2018 insiders. Cost of Cybercrime study
from Accenture & Ponemons 2019 says that average cost of
an insider attack rose 15% from 2018 to 2019. The Ponemon
Institute’s 2018 Cost of a Data Breach Study claims that an
organization requires on average 197 days to identify a security
breach and 69 days to contain it.
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The insider actions might only leave a small footprint in
the digital audit data because attackers know precisely how
and where sensitive data resides and is aware of the security
solutions implemented in the organization. This is why certain
insider incidents are not revealed for a long time. Inexpensive
data storage and increased computing power motivates data
scientists to acquire and analyze huge volume of audit log
data. Effective and efficient data analysis platforms for insider
attacks remains an open challenge.
Lot of research happen in the area of insider threat attacks.
Ivan Homoliak et.al [2] came up with novel categorization on
the types of insider threat data available with references to
existing works and framework available in the area of insider
detection and analysis. Sanzgiri and Dasgupta [3] classified
insider threat detection approaches into nine classes based on
the techniques and features utilized in the detection namely
: anomaly-based, role-based access control, scenario-based
using decoys and honeypots, risk analysis using psychological
factors, risk analysis using workflow, improving defense of
the network, improving defense by access control and process
control to dissuade insiders. Out of these classes, anomaly
based detection and user behavior analysis are popularly used.
User profiling used in behavior analysis helps in bringing out
the abnormal user behavior. It is well established as a primary
approach in insider threat detection. The anomaly detection
approach focuses on mining anomalous patterns from the
normal data or extracted feature vectors.
Different insider threat patterns such as unintentional human
errors, misuse of privilege by unsuspecting and malicious
users, cyber espionage, etc. aggravate the complexity of insider
threat detection. The data used in any learning algorithm
used for insider threat attack should be implicated as feature
vectors and used for discrepancy or user behavior analysis. In
this paper, we propose a method to detect insider threat. In
this approach, existing in-depth learning models are adopted
for anomaly detection in the context of insider threat detec-
tion. The proposed approach is evaluated experimentally and
compared to existing approaches, using a publicly available
dataset. The results suggest that the proposed approach is
effective.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 provides a general overview on the research context in
the insider threat attacks including the various approaches.
In Section 3, we explain our proposed approach and the
implementation. Section 4 discusses how we used CMU
dataset to create images and the pre-trained models to detect
insider threats. Finally in Section 5, we conclude the paper
by presenting limitations of our work and outlining scope for
future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Insider threat is a well studied problem that causes drastic
damages to the organizations. Researchers work on a plethora
of solutions for insider threat detection and prevention.
Zeadally et al [4] present a review of solutions for the insider
threat detection with their advantages and shortcomings. As
per the paper, the range of existing techniques are cate-
gorized into Intrusion-detection-based approaches, System-
call-based approaches, Data-centric approaches, Honeypot ap-
proaches, Dynamical-system-theory-based approaches, Anti-
indirect-exfiltration approaches and Visualization approaches.
One of the most popular approaches for insider threat
problem is framing the problem as an anomaly detection [5].
Chandola et al. [6] contributed a a well studied overview of
anomaly detection. In this paper, they summarize that anomaly
detection methods for sequences with multivariate data is still
in the budding stage. Machine learning methods can efficiently
tackle the anomaly detection problem and a lot of work happen
in that direction.
Gavai et al. [7] compare supervised classifier approach with
an Isolation Forest based unsupervised approach for detecting
insider threat using network logs. This work aggregates details
of those features that contribute most to the isolation of a data
sample in the tree to clearly understand why a user was tagged
as anomalous.
Liu et al. [8] proposed a method that could unravel the
non-linear relationships in audit data. An ensemble of deep
autoencoders is used to detect malicious insider activities by
calculating a score from the error resulting from the original
data and the reconstructed data. Features are extracted using
a frequency-based approach and these features are used to
create datasets for analysis. User behavior can be identified
from a set of attributes that are extracted for each category of
the audit data log. These features are then given as input to
an autoencoder which models the users’ behavior. A model
is built from each autoencoder for the input features from
each audit log. Any deviation of the behavior from the model
is treated as an anomaly. Finally, all the models from the
individual autoencoder is combined to build a single model
that is used to vividly identify the user’s behavior pattern.
This process takes more time and is not much efficient for
a dataset from a different source. One of the limitations to
this approach is that the feature extraction based on frequency
do not always give expected outcome. The one-hour interval
considered for user behavor study is not enough to identify
the usage patterns.
Noever [9] in his paper tried different families of learning
algorithms and concluded that random forest offers a better
result with an accuracy of 98%. The experiments are per-
formed using the CMU CERT dataset and the risk factors are
extracted from the data to create the feature vector. They have
incorporated the sentiment analysis factors from the email and
the website content and file access details.
Meng et al. [10] used an approach using Long Short-
Term Memory Recurrent Neural Network (LSTM-RNN) and
Kernel PCA for the analysis of insiders. The model was built
and tested using the CMU Insider Threat dataset v6.2. The
feature extraction approach vaguely mentioned the features
being used in the method. Performance comparison of the
proposed technique was done against popular algorithms such
as SVM and Isolation Forest, but it should have been compared
with other deep learning models.
In the paper, Lin et al [11] brought forth a hybrid method
using Deep Belief Networks(DBN) for feature reconstruction,
and One Class SVM (OCSVM) for insider threat detection. In
the first step, the features are learned using the DBN model.
Then the multi-domain features are re-learned and the hidden
features are extracted and trained by the first layer that is
visible in DBN followed by each layer of RBM. The last layer
is set up with the back propagation network which receives
the feature vector generated from RBM and optimizes the
parameters of the entire network. Finally, replace the last layer
of the network with the trained multilayer structure as a feature
extractor. These features are fed to One Class SVM (OCSVM)
to train the inside threat detection model which is referred to as
the DBN OCSVM model. Each day is divided into intervals of
fixed time and calculate the activity frequency from the audit
log files. The method achieved an accuracy of 87.79%.
Yuan et al [12], in their paper presented a user behavior
anomaly detection based insider threat detection technique
using Deep Neural Network (DNN). User actions sequences
are fed to a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) which extracts
user behavior features and predicts the next user action. A
sequence of hidden states of the LSTM model are used to
create a feature matrix of fixed-size which is given to the
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) that it as normal or
anomaly. The hidden units of the LSTM efficiently captures
the temporal behavior patterns. Hence, the long-term temporal
dependencies on user action sequence are recorded by LSTM.
CERT Insider Threat dataset V4.2. is used for experimentation
and the results are promising with an AUC of 0.9449.
Zhang et al. [13] focuses on the unsupervised deep learning
model DBN. Pre-processing stage includes the collection and
analysis of the insider behavior logs to extract the behavior
feature in the format of a tuple. It includes the time of the
occurrence of the behaviors, the behavior subject, the host that
produces the behaviors, and the specific behaviors. All kinds of
audit logs have the first three items common in it. The fourth
item behavior depends on the behavior types and are more
difficult to integrate. 1/N code discretization is applied on the
extracted features for data normalization. The deep learning
network model DBN uses these features for threat detection.
More than one RBM hidden layers with the sigma activation
function is used. Back propagation is used to fine tune the
network parameters to get an optimized DBN model. CMU
CERT dataset is used for method validation.
Chattopadhyay [14] proposed an approach for insider threat
detection based on classification of time-series user activities.
A features of every single day and its related statistics is
computed to construct the time-series features. Since the
dataset is highly imbalanced, a cost-sensitive technique for
data adjustment is used to randomly undersample the instances
belonging to non-malicious class. A deep autoencoder with
two layers is used for the classification. The observations show
that random forest and deep autoencoder classified the time-
series feature vectors with high precision, recall and f-score.
Multilayer perceptron gave a higher recall, but it resulted in a
low f-score and precision than the other classifiers.
A behavioral analysis framework (BAIT) was proposed by
Azaria et al. [15] for insider threat using a semi-supervised
classification method that learns from highly imbalanced data.
In this work, a one-person game has been designed and
795 players were recruited to play the game on Amazon
Mechanical Turk. A few subjects were added to behave
maliciously thereby introducing imbalance. Maliciousness is
predicted from the way a player plays the game. The paper
explains several variations of the BAIT algorithm, amongst
which the best approach gave a precision of only 0.07 and a
recall of 0.7.
Several surveys [16] [17] has happened in the area of insider
threat attack. Salem et al [16] mention about different kinds of
insider attack as traitors and masqueraders. The paper focused
on the challenges of insider threat and categorized most popu-
lar techniques into Host-based User Profiling, Network-Based
Sensors, Integrated Approaches. One of the main challenges
with the research in this direction is the lack of real-world
data to study common solutions and general models.
Charlie Soh et al [18] combines deep learning techniques
like Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) and skipgram to construct
temporal sentiment details of the employees. The Enron email
corpus has been used and anomaly detection is performed on
these employee profiles and employees are ranked upon this
anomaly score.
There are a lot of work( [19], [15]) proposed in the field
of insider threat detection and prevention using behavioral
analysis of people in an organization.
The class imbalance problem [20] has been considered
as a critical issue in machine learning as there are lack
of data in various domains and it makes serious impacts
on the performance evaluation of learning methods modeled
with an assumption of a balanced class distribution. This
paper studied the effect of undersampling,oversampling and
threshold-moving in the training phase of cost-sensitive neural
networks. Soft-ensemble and Hard-ensemble, i.e., the combi-
nation of oversampling, undersampling, and threshold-moving
using voting mechanisms are also experimented. The main
point to be noted is that none of these approaches require any
kind of algorithm modification of the neural networks.
The main challenge in insider threat analysis is the need
for algorithms and approaches that can efficiently find out the
malicious activities with reduced false negatives in optimal
time. This is a widely researched problem with a lot work and
surveys( [21], [22], [23]) still happening. There are various
factors like the data availability, the difficulty in identifying
the insider behavior in real-time etc are open issues. Our aim
is to come up with a better feature representation of the data
that can be applied on any kind of insider dataset.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
There are existing works that have effectively applied image
classification approaches and transfer learning for anomaly
detection in the domain of cybersecurity. Transfer learning has
been applied to malware classification [24] with an accuracy
of 98.65%. In the paper Kancherla and Mukkamala [25], has
Fig. 1: Process Flow
done malware detection by representing the executable as
grayscale images and extracting intensity based and texture
based features. This approach achieved an accuracy of 95% on
dataset containing 12000 benign samples and 25000 malware.
Tobiyama et al. [26] developed a malware detection method
that uses RNN to perform feature extraction. The extracted
features are represented as an image and a CNN is used for
classification to malicious or not and were able to achieve
96% accuracy. There are papers like [27], [28] that proved
the image based deep learning analyis for malwares. Recently,
Bhodia et. al [29] used the image based transfer learning for
malware analysis. This has motivated us to use image classi-
fication approaches for insider threat detection. The behavior
of insiders is determined from audit data and mapped to an
image. Image classification approaches are applied to these
images for anomaly detection. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work that applies the image classification with
the deep learning approach on insider attacks.
The proposed methodology consists of four parts: Pre-
processing and Feature extraction, Normalization of the fea-
ture vectors, Feature vector representation and Classification.
Figure 1 shows the proposed process flow.
The feature extraction module reads the log files from
the CMU CERT Dataset [30]. The log files consists of
logon/logoff information, the files handled by the user, the
external devices used by the user, email communications sent
and received by the user, http details of the browsing history.
The logs contain raw information in the form of rows and
columns. These logs are used to extract useful features from
the data.
A. Feature Extraction
The logon.csv is used to extract the information of the
computer usage, the session information, the number of ses-
sions within and outside office hours etc to understand the
computer usage pattern on each day. This information helps
to understand the users access patterns on the computer in the
organization. The file.csv gives details about the files copied
or read or written by the user on each date. This information
can be used to analyze the file access patterns of the user.
Device.csv log file contains the external device access details
of the user of the organization for each day. It helps in finding
the users access to any device within and the outside office
hours. Usage of the devices outside office hours is suspicious
activity. The email.csv file contains information about the
emails sent and received by the employee in and outside the
office hours and the recipient list. The recipient list helps in
Fig. 2: Images creation from Audit Files
identifying any external entity who received mail from him.
The http.csv is about the browsing information of the user in
the organization.
Features are extracted from all the log files and a feature
vector is constructed. All the events in the log files are
used to construct the feature vector. The feature extraction
mentioned in the paper [14] are used in this work. In the
paper [14], 20 features are mentioned. They use a scenario
based approach using the ground-truth information available
for malicious activity. In our work, we use the CMU data
and extract 20 features for feature representation. L1 to L9
features are extracted from the logon.csv file and it gives
the daily computer usage pattern. E1 to E5 gives the email
communication details of the user. F1 gives the file access of
the user. D1 to D3 are the attributes that explain about the
external device usage of the employees. H1 to H3 is used to
identify the web access patterns of the user. All these features
together contribute to the feature set of the classification task.
The features contain numeric values. The data distribution
into various bins might give varying results in the model eval-
uation. Min-Max normalization is performed to bin the data
in a range 0 to 1 for each date. This date wise normalization
is done to ensure that the features are in the same range per
day.
The event logs do not contain the malicious user details.
The CERT dataset provides the ground truth to mark the users
as malicious or non-malicious. The ground truth contain the
details of users and the malicious events that has happened
with the date and time. The class distribution is highly
imbalanced. Majority of the classes belong to non-malicious as
the insider attacks happen not so frequently. So the imbalanced
data needs to be modified to get better results. Here, we use
the random undersampling mechanism since the number of
non-malicious instances are very high than the malicious ones.
The undersampling is performed with various ratios and the
evaluation is performed.
B. Image-based Feature Vector Representation
The features extracted from the log files are represented
as grayscale images and the classification is done to get the
malicious and non-malicious users. Figure 3 depicts the image
creation process from CMU Cert data. The audit files from the
CMU dataset are pre-processed to obtain in the feature vector
of each user for each day.Each vector is of size 1 x 20. This
Fig. 3: Image creation sequence
helps in getting the system usage pattern of each user on a
daily basis. It is represented as a grayscale image where each
pixel is an attribute that ranges from 0-255. The images are
reshaped to a size of 32x32 for training. Each user’s daily log
pattern is represented as the grayscale images.
C. Transfer Learning for Anomaly Detection
Transfer learning [31] is a research direction in machine
learning that focuses on retaining knowledge obtained during
one problem solving and re-applying it to another similar
problem. Transfer learning is commonly used with predictive
modeling problems that use image data as input. One or more
layers from the trained model are then used in a new model
trained on the problem of interest.
A pre-trained network performs transfer learning by adding
a few dense layers towards the end of the pre-trained network.
The learning process aims at finding the most suitable combi-
nation of these already learnt features and see how it helps in
identifying the samples in our dataset. This makes the training
phase fast and requires less data than training a DCNN from
the scratch.
Transfer learning is mainly used to eliminate the overhead
in training. Transfer learning models can be classified into
four: instance-based, parameter, feature-representation and
relational-knowledge transfer learning [31]. Out of these clas-
sifications, feature-representation-transfer learning is used for
obtaining a better feature representation for the target domain.
In the proposed work, feature-representation transfer learning
is most suitable. A CNN pre-trained on the ImageNet is used,
where the top layers are replaced with the classification head.
There is remarkable reduction in the training time, hence pre-
trained models are preferred wherever applicable.
Network Architecture
Deep learning Convolutional Neural Network models are
popularly used in image classification and recognition. In order
to train and test the images, each input image is passed through
a series of convolution layers with filters, pooling, and fully
connected layers. We have used the most popular pre-trained
models like VGG16, Inception and Mobilenet.
Feature extraction is being done in the base model. As we
have a different dataset which is not much similar to the data
Fig. 4: Transfer Learning
that is used for the pre-training of the original model, we do
the customization of the network and re-train the model. The
base model uses the different layers of the pre-trained network
to do the feature extraction. In this stage the pixels of the
input image are converted into features. Then these features
are passed onto classification layer. The global pooling layer
does a more intense reduction in dimensionality, such that a
tensor of dimension hwd is reduced to a dimensions 11d. Once
the features are extracted, it is passed to the fully connected
layer and the last layer that does the prediction in terms of the
probability.
Input images
We created grayscale images from the log files. The pre-
trained network is used for transfer learning. The image size
really matters in transfer learning as the image input size is
224 x 224 etc. Since our feature vector is of small size, we
update the input shape dimensions to accept images with the
dimensions of our data and has used an image size of 32x32.
If the input dimensions are too large, your network might fail
to achieve reasonable accuracy as there are no enough layers
in the network to learn the features. If the dimensions of the
input image are too small, then the neural network naturally
reduces volume dimensions during the forward propagation
and then effectively run out of data.
Figure 4 gives an overview of the training phase in the
transfer learning. The grayscale images are passed to the
DCNN to issue predictions. The network does the prediction
using the probability. The error in the prediction is calculated
using the loss function.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Effectiveness of the proposed method is implemented in
Keras with Tensorflow as backend, an open source software
platform from Google. In the following section, we detail
about the data used parameters tuned,and present the results
and analysis.
A. Dataset
We use CMU CERT insider threat dataset v4.2 [30] to
simulate the proposed method. CMU CERT data is a bench-
mark data for insider threat detection with a set of event
logs generated from the computer network of a simulated
organization. We used the five event files: logon/logoff activity,
http data, email communications, file operations, and usage of
external storage device. 1000 users generate 3320452 events
(log lines) during a period of 501 days. Table I gives the
overview of the data.
TABLE I: Dataset Details
Total instances 330452
Malicious 1364
Non-Malicious 329088
B. Random Sampling of Training Data
In the CMU dataset, the number of malicious instances are
very less when compared to that of the non-malicious ones.
This shows that the data is highly imbalanced in terms of
the class distribution. Imbalanced data typically refers to the
data used by the classification tasks where the classes are not
distributed equally. For instance, in a binary classification with
100 samples in which 80 samples are labeled as Class 1, and
rest of the 20 samples are labeled as Class-2. In this example of
an imbalanced dataset, the ratio of Class 1 to Class 2 samples
is 4:1.
Imbalanced datasets can be dealt with various strategies
like adapting the classification algorithms or balancing classes
in the training data before providing the data as input to
the learning algorithm. The sampling technique is applied to
either add more samples to the minority class referred to as
oversampling or remove the samples from the majority class
referred to as undersampling. The main idea is to achieve a
better balance in the data sample for all the classes.
Undersampling means randomly selecting a subset of sam-
ples from the instances with majority class to avoid its
influence from dominating the algorithm learning process. The
most common method for doing this is resampling without
replacement. In the proposed method, we have used undersam-
pling to make the data balanced to some extent. The original
data has an imbalance ratio of 241 : 1. We have used sampling
ratio of 150:1 to undersample the majority class instances. On
undersampling, only the majority class instance count changes.
The minority class instances remain the same. The original
dataset is split into 75% training and remaining is used as test
set.
C. Pre-trained CNN Model
The pre-trained models use two methods to build new
models: Feature extraction and Fine-tuning. Having learned
a better representation of features from the large Imagenet
dataset, the models can act as a feature extractoe for our
dataset as well. Though our images are different from the
imagenet data, the model should still be able to extract the
relevant features from it based on the principles of transfer
learning. Load the pre-trained weight trained in the Imagenet
data. No weight update is performed in the feature extraction,
hence freeze all the lower convolutional layers. Add top layers
needed for classifying the classes in the dataste being trained.
Here, we train the last layers by adding a global pooling layer
Fig. 5: Transfer Learning for new Classes
to reduce the image dimension, a fully connected layer to
convert the features into a single prediction per image and
the last classification layer and train the top layers. The final
output is the probabilities for each of the classes in our dataset.
The accuracy obtained from the feature extractor model is not
as expected.
In the feature extraction, we trained a few top layers
of the base model. During the training, the weights of the
pre-trained network were not updated. Fine-tuning can be
applied to increase the performance. Here, a few other layers
will be trained by updating the weights while training. The
training process will tune the weights to match the features
in our dataset. Usually the higher layers of the convolutional
networks are more specialized. The lower layers learn generic
and simple features that can be generalized to most of the
images. Moving up the network, the features become more
specific to the dataset on which the model is being trained.
The main goal of fine-tuning is to use the specialized features
with the desired dataset, rather than overwriting the generic
learning.
Figure 5 gives the details of the network architecture being
used for feature extraction and fine tuning. The proposed
approach creates a base model that is pre-trained on the
ImageNet dataset, a large dataset of 1.4M images and 1000
classes of web images. In our dataset, we have only two
classes. In this case, the last layer of the pre-trained model
is not helpful. In order to customize the model for the binary
classification, load a network without the classification layers
at the top. The number of neurons in the last layer of the
network should be same as the number of classes to be
identified in the dataset. So the 1000 neuron layer is discarded
and added our own last layer for the network. In our last layer,
we have two neurons as there are two classes(Malicious and
Non malicious) with the softmax activation.
The weight is initialized with the imagenet weight used in
the training of the original model. Among various Stochastic
Gradient descent(SGD), we used the Adams optimizer. Since
there are only two class variables, we used the binary crossen-
tropy logarithmic loss function. In a classification task, Soft-
max function is applied to classify an image with probabilistic
values ranging between 0 and 1.
D. Training and Testing
Table II shows the number of instances in the feature
matrix after normalization. Out of 330452 samples, 1364 are
malicious. The undersampling is applied on the 75% training
data, i.e on the 247838 instances.Upon undersampling the
majority class instances, the number of instances in majority
malicious class reduced to 153900.
TABLE II: Training and Test Data
CMU Class Wise Data
Data Malicious Non-Malicious Total
Total 1364 329088 330452
Training(Sampled) 1026 153900 154926
Testing 338 82276 82614
E. Results
The performance evaluation of the model has been done
using the CMU data transformed to grayscale images. The
weights used in the original pre-trained models are used, but
with varying hyper parameters. As it is a binary classification
problem, the accuracy, precision and recall are used to com-
pare the results. Table III gives the comparison of the proposed
approach with the other existing works.
TABLE III: Experiment Results
Method Precision Recall
BAIT [?] 51.44 82.09
Modified Isolation Forest [32] 51.44 82.09
Deep Auto Encoder [14] 50.42 90.25
LSTM-RNN [10] 95.12 NA
Proposed Method3 99.32 99.32
F. Discussion
We proposed the image based insider threat analysis. In this
work, we used the CMU CERT insider data to demonstrate
our results. The preliminary results obtained clearly shows
the improvement in the precision and recall of the existing
approaches. The existing approaches used different feature ex-
traction and representation, whereas we have used the feature
representation as images. The CNN has trained the data to
understand the usage patterns of the user and tries to find the
anomalous usage.
The classification process classified the users as malicious
and non-malicious. Our approach achieved an accuracy of 99%
when compared to other techniques. The feature extraction
process is not simply frequency based, it helped in identifying
the access patterns of various resources like computer, files,
external device usage etc of the users on a daily basis. Still
there are chances of improvement to the pre-processing and
representation used here.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Recent research had shown that deep learning can learn
effectively and efficiently from very complex mappings be-
tween inputs and outputs directly from the data. It was proven
successfully in numerous elds like speech recognition, image
recognition, Natural Language Processing (NLP), etc. But,
the huge number of hidden neurons and layers used in Deep
Neural Networks end up in computationally intensive vector
and matrix operations involving millions of parameters, that
needs high-performance computing resources. Moreover, it is
impractical to collect labeled data samples in many real-world
domains to train a network from the scratch. In such cases, a
pre-trained deep learning model can be used with ne-tuning
it to adapt to the required task with available data and it
has resulted in successful results. In this paper, we studied
and evaluated the deep transfer learning technique, to use
deep learning models trained on ImageNet and transfer their
learning capability to perform insider threat detection from the
grayscale images created out of the CMU CERT audit data
logs. The following are some remarkable findings:
• Image based anomaly detection can be applied on security
related issues.
• The grayscale images used on the pre-trained DNN
models gave high precision and recall when compared
to the existing works.
There is a vast scope for future work on image-based security
analysis. Various other attacks can be framed as image or
pattern recognition problems and apply the DNN to solve the
same. Additionally, more experiments are needed helpful to
better portray this effect and prove the success of image-based
analytics.
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